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INTRODUCTION
When I thought about what I should prepare for this analysis
and debate on state funding of religious institutions, I concluded
that I should try to bring together the comparative dimension
and the broader context from a bystander's perspective. The
challenge of the role of religion and religious institutions in
modern societies is shared by every society on the face of the
globe, regardless of the model of the concept that it has selected
for the interrelation between state and church, or state and reli-
* LL.B., LL.M (Jerusalem); M.C.L., D.C.L. (University of Chicago); Law
Professor, Hebrew University ofJerusalem; former Minister of Religious Affairs
in the late Rabin government (1992-96). This paper is based on a paper
presented at the AALS Annual Meeting in January 1999. I wish to express my
gratitude to the Section on Law and Religion, and the chairpersons of this
session, Professors Marci Hamilton and John Garvey, for inviting me to take
part in the panel of the AALS Annual meeting in New Orleans, January 1999.
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gion. The analysis of the broader conceptual models and prac-
tices in other countries should serve to clarify the dilemma and
the desired choices for resolving it. In Israel we have been sub-
jected to the excessive use, and often misuse, of state funds by
religious institutions in the formal education system as well as in
the formal education and social services. Not only is a great and
effective organizational power exercised by these religious insti-
tutions in Israel, that is defined by American standards as "perva-
sively sectarian"1 in American terminology, but this power has
been employed to introduce social changes and to effect strong
political impact. Thus, for example, the "Shass" party in Israel
has grown from four seats in the Knesset (the Parliament) in
1988 to ten seats in 1996.
Education systems of religious movements in Israel-"El-
Hamaayan" and the "Independent Haredi Education"-tend to
have an advantage over the regular education system, as they pro-
vide lower or no-cost education. The result is that these systems
divert the student and his family to a Haredi Ultra-Orthodox way
of life, competing with the secular way of life. This is not merely
a matter of belief but it results in a structural social change
because it causes the exclusion of the student from the work
force and from the regular military service as well as the reserve
duty.
Some of the lines of argument advanced by scholars on the
issue of the constitutionality of the voucher system in the United
States such as the focus on equality by Professor Alan Brownstein,
and the great concern for excessive government entanglements,
2
could find support in the undesirable and objectionable prac-
tices which developed in Israel in the area of state funding of
faith-based institutions.
I shall attempt to give in this paper a brief analysis of the
conceptual models of church and state relationships and analyze
1. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610 (1988); Roemer v. Board of
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743
(1972); Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty,
Equality, and Free Speech Values-A Critical Analysis of "Neutrality Theory" and
Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 243, 244-46 (1999);
Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and the
Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 285, 292-300
(1999); Stephen V. Monsma, The "Pervasively Sectarian" Standard in Theory and
Practice, 13 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321, 323-25 (1999); Marci A.
Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers (1999) (paper
presented at AALS Annual meeting, January 1999) (on file with author).
2. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971); Brownstein, supra note 1; Esbeck, supra note 1, at 304-11;
Hamilton, supra note 1.
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contemporary issues of law and religion in Israel in comparative
perspectives with a view that some of my comments can add a
dimension to the ongoing debate in the United States on charita-
ble choice.3 It is not my intention to directly take sides between
the alternative approaches of Professors Carl Esbeck, Alan
Brownstein, Marci Hamilton and John Garvey on the very hot
issue of charitable choice; nor is it my intention to address myself
in detail to the controversy in the United States on the limits of
government grants, direct and indirect, to faith-based agencies
which provide social services.
I will venture to say that the pervasively sectarian test seems a
reasonable formula that should be developed as much as the pri-
mary-secular purpose test was developed to give a dynamic
response to other challenges on the government actions in mat-
ters of religion.4
The question of allocating financial support to religious
institutions has lately become a central and crucial question in
Israel. Increasing criticism over this question has been heard
amongst the Israeli secular society and in the Knesset. Many sec-
tors that request the state's financial support claim that the state
should not support the religious institutions, or at least distribute
the money equally between the religious and secular organiza-
tions. In fact, this question is part of a broader debate-the
question of the relationship between state and religion: Should
the modern state interfere with matters of religion? Should we
allow religious interests to influence the state's policy and legisla-
tion? These questions have preoccupied the Israeli nation since
the state's establishment, but lately they have assumed a greater
place in the public agenda. These issues will be discussed in this
article. The issue of state funding of religious institutions is
largely dependent on the concept of the relationship between
state and religion.
I will first examine the question of state and religion, review-
ing the possible models concerning the relationship between
state and religion. I will then offer an examination of the solu-
tions adopted in the United States, England, and in Canada.
Later, I shall offer an analysis of the complicated situation in
Israel regarding state and religion with a focus on state financing
of religious institutions. In the last section, I will discuss the
recent challenges of Israeli society as a result of the increasing
3. See Esbeck, supra note 1, at 285-87; Monsma, supra note 1, at 321 & n.1;
Hamilton, supra note 1.
4. See Shimon Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges on Grounds of Religions and
Conscience, 62 Ky. L.J. 377 (1974).
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power of religious parties, predominantly because of the large
funds the religious institutions receive for schools, and other
non-profit organizations.
I. AN ANALYSIS OF THE MODELS OF THE INTERRELATION
BETWEEN STATE AND RELIGION
The relationship between state and religion can be reflected
in different models. These models can be divided into five mod-
els: the theocratic model, the absolute-secular model, the separa-
tion of state and religion model, the established church model,
and the recognized religion model. Two of these models are
non-democratic: the theocratic model and the absolute secular
model, which are the most extreme models. The theocratic model
suggests that the religion will dominate the state. This theory
means that there is one officially recognized religion, and other
religions are forbidden. The ruler of the state is a representative
of this religion, and the state's law is religious law. This model is
held as non-democratic because it maintains a system that causes
the deprivation of freedom of religion (and freedom from reli-
gion). In the contemporary world we may find theocratic ele-
ments in the Middle East countries such as Saudi-Arabia and the
Chumenistic Islamic Republic of Iran. The other non-demo-
cratic model, the absolute secular model, is the rejection of any reli-
gion, and adherence to formal atheism by the state. The law
forbids any religious act, and freedom of religion is deprived.
Examples of this model could be found in communist regimes, as
in the former Soviet Union.
A modem theory of law and government rejects these forms
of non-democratic models of state and religion. The democratic
state must promise and preserve the freedom of religion, which
is defined as the freedom of any religion to maintain its religious
activity, and the freedom of any person to maintain his faith and
religion, to fulfil its commandments, and to worship.5 Another
right that a democratic state must ensure is the freedom from
religion, which is the freedom of any person not to fulfil any reli-
gious commandments. The individual should be free from fulfil-
ling any religious duty, and be free from being subjected to the
need for recourse to religious institution, or religious ritual. He
must be free of any religious restriction, and he should have
every right of speech, belief and equality before the law, regard-
5. See RALPH BENYAMIN NEUBERGER, RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL 16
(1997) (Hebrew). The freedom of religion will be limited only when the
fulfillment of the religious commandments would result in violence, in breach
of the public order, or in deprivation of civil rights.
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less of his religious affiliation. The foundation of the democratic
state is secular law: the law that rules is the secular law, which has
been accepted and determined in a democratic way by legislation
in a democratic parliament and which does not contradict the
principles of democracy.'
There are (as mentioned above) three models of the rela-
tionship between state and religion which maintain these impor-
tant principles of democracy.7 The first model is the separation of
state and religion model The idea is that there is a distinction
between the government and religion. The legislation, in its
nature, is secular, its purposes are non-religious, and there is no
preference for any religion. The separation of state and religion
is expressed in the principle that the state does not interfere with
religious organizations and these organizations do not interfere
in the matters of the state. This separation can be created in
different ways: the state can declare itself expressly as a secular
or non-religious state (as declared in the constitutions of
France,8 India,9 and post-communist Russia' ° ) or as "neutral"
concerning matters of religion (such as in the constitutions of
Australia," Ireland,"2 and Spain'"). Another way is an explicit
declaration of the separation of state and religion (as declared in
the constitution of Catholic Poland, 4 or the First Amendment of
6. See id. at 17.
7. Today, the United Nations accepts that the fact that a state adopts a
regime of state-religion separation or establishes a formal religion does not
necessarily mean a violation of freedom of religion or discrimination on a
religious basis. See Note iry the Secretary-General: Elimination ofAll Forms of Religious
Intolerance, U.N. Doc. A/8330, Ann. III (1971).
8. See FR. CONST. art. 2, § 1 ("France is an indivisible, secular, democratic,
and social Republic.").
9. See INDIA CONST. preamble ("having solemnly resolved to constitute
India into a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic.").
10. See Russ. KONsTrruTsIIA [Constitution] RF art. 14, § 1 (1993) ("The
Russian Federation shall be a secular state. No religion may be instituted as
state-sponsored or mandatory religion.").
11. See AusTL. CONSr. § 116 ("The Commonwealth shall not make any law
for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the
Commonwealth.").
12. See IR. CONST. art. 44, § 2.2 ("The State guarantees not to endow any
religion.").
13. See SPAIN CONSrcI6N [Constitution] [C.E.] art. 16, § 1 ("Freedom of
ideology, religion, and cult of individuals and communities is guaranteed
without any limitation in their demonstrations other than that which is
necessary for the maintenance of public order protected by law.").
14. See POL. CONST. art. 25, § 3 ("The relationship between the State and
churches and other religious organizations shall be based on the principle of
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the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the
Supreme Court15 ). A regime of separation of religion and state
does not indicate the state's approach toward religion. The sepa-
ration may be a result of a favorable attitude toward religion and
a commitment to a respectful approach to religion (as in the case
of the United States) or of a less favorable attitude towards reli-
gion (as in the case of France).
The second model is the established church model, which
means that the state recognizes a certain religion and a certain
church as the state's national church. This recognition does not
mean that other religions are prohibited or that a person must
be a member of the established church, but that the state for-
mally prefers a certain religion and gives it a priority over other
religions. It can be expressed in a constitutional provision, in the
state's financial support to institutions of this religion, and in
benefits given to the members of this religion. The difference
between this model and the theocratic model is in the approach
towards other religions and non-religious people. While the
state in the theocratic model does not tolerate other religions
and non-religious groups, the state in the established church
model is a democratic state (or at least it has democratic charac-
teristics in the matter of freedom of religion). Examples of states
that adopted this model are: England (the Anglican Church is
the Church of England), 6 Denmark, 17 Norway,' s Iceland, 9 Fin-
land (the Anglo-Lutheran Church),2° Greece,21 and Bulgaria
respect for their autonomy and the mutual independence of each in its own
sphere, as well as on the principle of cooperation for the individual and the
common good.").
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1 ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ").
16. See Act of Supremacy, 1534 (Eng.) (issued by King Henry VIII,
repudiating papal supremacy and declaring the King to be the supreme head of
the Church of England).
17. See DEN. CONST. part 1, § 4 ("The Evangelical Lutheran Church shall
be the Established Church of Denmark, and, as such, it shall be supported by
the State.").
18. See NOR. CONST. art. 2, § 2 ("The Evangelical-Lutheran religion shall
remain the official religion of the State. The inhabitants professing it are
bound to bring up their children in the same.").
19. See ICE. CONST. art. 62 ("The Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be
the State Church in Iceland and, as such, it shall be supported and protected by
the state.").
20. See FIN. CONST. § 83 ("Provisions on the organisation and
administration of the Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be prescribed in the
Church Code.").
21. See GREECE CONST. art. 3, § 1 ("The prevailing religion in Greece is
that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ.").
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(the Eastern Orthodox Church).22 There are states in which the
recognition of one formal church is only a symbolic-declarative
one (such as the recognition of the Catholic Church in Liechten-
stein,23 Monaco,24 and Malta25). This is the endorsed church sub-
model. In other states, the recognition of the established church
has operative implications.
Another model is the recognized religions model. The state in
this model does not recognize one formal religion; a formal
national state church does not exist. Rather, the state's approach
in the matters of state and religion is a neutral approach. This
model is reminiscent of the separation model, because the state
does not interfere in the internal matters of the religion, such as
the appointment of the priests. The difference between these
two models is that in the recognized religions model, the
churches are recognized by the state as special corporations, and
the state is responsible for supplying religious-services and for
financing the foundation and maintenance of the churches.
There is a cooperation of the state with all the recognized
churches, without preferring one to the other. This is the model
adopted in Germany, which accepts as "recognized religions" the
Catholic, the Protestant, the Anglican, the Jewish and the Muslim
communities.26 Another country which adopted this model is
post-communist Hungary, which implements this model in a
more liberal way.
27
II. RELIGION AND STATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Having presented the possible models and attitudes toward
the question of the preferable relationship between state and
religion, I will now focus on the solutions adopted in some of the
above-mentioned states.
22. See BULG. CONST. art. 13, § 3 ("Eastern Orthodox Christianity is
considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria.").
23. See LIECH. CONST. art. 37, para. 2.
24. See MONACO CONST. art 9.
25. See MALTA CONST. § 2 (1) ("The religion of Malta is the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Religion.").
26. See F.R.G. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 140, incorporating
F.R.G. WEIMAR CoNsTrruTioN (1919) art. 137, § 4 ("Religious bodies acquire
legal capacity according to the general provisions of civil law."), § 6 ("Religious
bodies that are corporate bodies under public law are entitled to levy taxes in
accordance with State law on the basis of the civil taxation lists.").
27. For the differences between the Hungarian system and the German
system, see NEUBERGER, supra note 5, at 15.
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A. The United States
The United States of America adopted the separation of
state and religion model, and, in fact, the U.S. is the common
example for this model. The First Amendment of the federal
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."2 Literally, this clause does not constitute a regime of
separation. However, this section is interpreted as the adoption
of the separation model. This interpretation is based on two
important parts of the section: the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause. The purpose of the Establishment Clause
is to protect the State from any religious regime and from reli-
gious influences. Neither the Congress, nor any other state
actor, may establish any formal preferable religion, and the
state's view on the matters of religion shall be neutral. This
clause disestablishes the connection between the church and the
government, and assures the pluralism of religions. The second
clause, the Free Exercise Clause, deals with the other aspect of
separation of state and religion. Its purpose is to protect the
churches from the interference of the state and to maintain the
freedom of religion and belief. The combination of the two
clauses is the basis of the "wall theory," that claims that the Con-
stitution creates a complete separation between state and reli-
gion.29 In the words of Thomas Jefferson, the clause against the
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of
separation between church and State."'"0 This means that the
government must maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor
opposing religion, a neutrality between the different religions,
and between the religious and non-religious. 3'
Generally, the meaning of the separation principle is that
the state does not prefer one religion to the others and that dis-
crimination of this kind is forbidden. However, there is serious
controversy over the question of the desirable degree of separa-
tion. The same controversy arises with regards to the question of
financial support granted to religious institutions. According to
one approach, separation must be widely interpreted, and the
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 & 2.
29. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). This case dealt
with the question of governmental financial allowances for travel expenses for a
Catholic school's students. The Court adopted the "wall theory" and decided
that these payments were not against the Constitution.
30. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1,
1802), reprinted inJOHN F. WILSON, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 75-
76 (1965).
31. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1958).
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prohibition of the state's interference in matters of religion
should be total and strict. The state must not be involved in any
matter concerning religion and must not finance any religious
goal by public funds. Any governmental action that may assist
imposition of a religion or that might create this sort of risk is
forbidden, according to this view, by the Constitution, because it
is "an establishment of a religion. '3 2 Those who hold this view
oppose any governmental support. Therefore, they oppose not
only religion lessons in public schools, but they negate the carry-
ing out of those lessons in the public schools' buildings in the
afternoons, as well as any governmental support to private reli-
gion lessons outside school. This was the dominant approach by
the Supreme Court of the United States during the period of the
late 1940s until the early 1980s."3 Hence, it was decided that all
prayers in school are unconstitutional and that religious symbols
cannot be set up in public places.
However, this approach is not the only view held in the
United States. According to the other interpretation to the "sep-
aration" concept, the interpretation of the First Amendment
should be literal and strict, and therefore, as long as the state
does not prefer one religion or church over the others, the state
is allowed to support religious schools and to introduce any other
religious customs which are common to all religions (such as
introducing a moment of silence, when the students may pray or
not pray, according to their belief and view). The fact that a cer-
tain matter involves religious elements or that the governmental
act results in an indirect support of a certain religion does not
make this activity unconstitutional. Some of the scholars claim
that religious services are a basic need, and that the preservation
of the freedom of religion obliges the state to support these
kinds of services. According to this view, a coherent ideal obliges
adopting the stricter interpretation of the separation term (the
second view)." Thus, in a modern welfare state, which is sup-
posed to support basic public services, there is a conflict between
32. See Alan Schwartz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Value, 77
YALE L.J. 692 (1968); Alan Schwartz, The Nonestablishment Principle: A Reply to
Professor Fiannlla, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1465 (1968).
33. Although it must be mentioned that the judgments on this topic are
inconsistent. Compare, for example, the contradicting verdicts: Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952). See also SHIMON SHETREET, FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELiGION
103 n.13 (1975) (Hebrew).
34. See Ruth Gavison, Religion and State: Separation and Privatization, 2
MISHPAT VE' MIMsHAL 55, 63 (1994) (Hebrew) (especially note 15, which directs
to the important judgment); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
(upholding as not violating the Establishment Clause a Minnesota statute which
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the principles of separation on the one hand and freedom of
religion on the other hand. Preserving the freedom of religion
without violating the establishment prohibition is a very difficult
task. Therefore, this view supports the stricter interpretation of
"establishment."35
It should be mentioned that the fact that the United States
adopted the separation model does not mean that its approach
toward religion is hostile. On the contrary, American society is
very religious, and anti-religious groups are considered marginal.
The religiousness of American society can be found in all areas
of life. For example, some of the formal holidays are Christian,
and on Good Friday the flag is lowered in memory ofJesus' cruci-
fixion; the words "In God We Trust" are written on every unit of
currency; the oaths of trust of the President and his executive
officers, the judges, and the members of Congress conclude with
the words, "so help me God"; priests and rabbis serve in the
army; and churches are exempt from taxation. An analysis of all
of these religious characteristics reveals that the state religious-
ness is mostly not of a specific religion, but rather a reflection of
the faith in one God (and not particularly in Jesus). This is a
kind of a new religion, a "civil religion" that contains compo-
nents of many different religions, although it is closer to Christi-
anity than to any other religion.36
It may be argued that this religiousness of the society contra-
dicts the separation principle, or at least the aim of the separa-
tion. However, in fact, there is no conflict between those two
principles. Separation's aim is to ensure that the pluralism of
religions and views are respected and preserved. The separation
model intends to ensure a complete freedom of religion and
from religion, and the method chosen to achieve this goal is the
neutrality of the state on the question of religion. Therefore,
the government would not finance religious activities and reli-
gious institutions (this is the first approach-the broadening
approach, which was described above), but some forms of indi-
rect support are not totally excluded.
permitted parents to take a tax deduction for expenses incurred in sending
their children to parochial schools).
35. The value of freedom of religion is more important, according to this
view, than the value of separation. For the comparison of these values, see
Wilber G. Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426
(1953).
36. See generally E. Gutman, Links between Church and State in the Democratic
West, in RELIGION AND STATE IN ISRAEL 7-20 (Dana Arieli-Horvitz ed., 1995)
(Hebrew).
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B. England
England adopted a different answer than that of the United
States on the question of the link between state and religion: the
established church model. However, what does the term "estab-
lishment" mean in the British context? Two decisions in this cen-
tury have attempted to define "establishment" in the law. In
Marshall v. Graham," Judge Phillimore stated that
a church which is established is not thereby made a depart-
ment of state. The process of establishment means that the
state has accepted the Church as the religious body in its
opinion truly teaching the Christian faith, and given to it a
certain legal position and to its decrees, if rendered under
certain legal conditions certain civil sanctions.3 8
The House of Lords also considered the legal characteristics of
establishment 9 and decided that in one sense,
the words "established church" are used to mean the
church as by law established in any country as the public or
state-recognized form of religion. The process of establish-
ment means that the state has accepted the church as the
religious body which in its opinion truly teaches the Chris-
tian faith, inheres given its a certain legal position and to
its decrees, if given under certain legal conditions, certain
legal actions. In the fullest sense, a church is said to be
established when all the provisions constituting the
church's system or organization receive the sanction of a
law, which establishes that system throughout the state and
excludes another system.4"
The expressions of the adoption of the establishment system can
be found in many areas. First, the King (or the Queen) is the
head of the Established Church, and he must be Anglican in
order to rule the kingdom. He cannot convert his religion-in
the Coronation Oath he pledges to maintain the Protestant
Reformed Religion established by the law, and to declare himself
as the "Defender of the Faith."'"
The acknowledgement and support by the state of one for-
mal religion can be illustrated with many other examples: the
Established Church organizes the formal state ceremonies, such
as the monarch's coronation ceremony or requiem ceremonies
37. 2 K.B. 112 (1907).
38. Id. at 126.
39. See General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Lord Overtoun,
App. Cas. 515 (Eng. H.L. 1904).
40. 14 Hals. (4th) 334, at 158-59.
41. Coronation Oath Act, 1688, 1 W. & M. 1, ch. 6.
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for soldiers who died in a war; twenty-six of the senior bishops,
including the archbishops of York and Canterbury, sit in the
House of Lords as "Lords Spiritual"; all the measures of the
Established Church, which are accepted by the General Synod
(the general assembly of the church) must get the confirmation
of the Parliament; the Book of Common Prayer is confirmed by
the Parliament;42 and the monarch appoints the archbishops and
bishops at the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Another
example is the Law of Blasphemy, which holds that "to reproach
the Christian Religion is to speak in subversion of the law."4" In
the schools, a daily act of collective worship is accustomed, and
the prayers in most of the country schools in England and Wales
are of a Christian nature and reflect the basic principles of the
Christian tradition (without referring a specific church). In
addition, religious lessons are carried out in the public schools,
but the parents may forbid their children's participation in those
lessons and in the daily conduct of collective worship.
The conclusion of this analysis is that the British system cre-
ated a strong linkage between state and religion, between the
British nation and the Established Church. It must be men-
tioned that despite the fact that there is one religion that the
state formally prefers, other religions are not discriminated
against and there is complete freedom of religion.
In this system, where religion takes a great part in the
nation's life and gets a formal acknowledgement from the state,
it is natural that the state financially supports religious institu-
tions that belong to the Established Church. This is another
expression of the tight link between the state and its formal
religion.
C. Canada
The constitutional relationship between state and religion in
Canada reflects the historical and constitutional inheritance of
the British understanding of the proper relationship of "church
and state" and of parliamentary government, as modified by the
historical evolution in the Canadian experience.44 Canadian
constitutional law has never fully accepted the Christian theolo-
42. For example, the Book of Common Prayer was annexed to the Act of
Uniformity in 1662. Similar confirmation of the Book of Common Prayer
occurred in 1588, 1872, 1990 and 1994.
43. See generally Robert C. Post, Blasphemy, the First Amendment and the
Concept of Intrinsic Harm, 8 TEL AvIv U. STUD. L. 293 (1988).
44. See generally M.H. OGILVIE, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND THE LAW IN
CANADA 77-109 (1996).
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gies,45 despite the fact that Canada is, and has always been, a
country with an enormous Christian majority. The British con-
cept of parliamentary sovereignty means that in the Canadian
practice, Parliament has supreme and sovereign authority over
the affairs of all individuals and institutions within its geographi-
cal jurisdiction, including all religious institutions and the reli-
gious practices of individual citizens, subject only to the generally
applicable constitutional limitations on its sovereign legislative
power.46 This means that the Canadian Parliament theoretically
has supreme authority over all religious institutions and individu-
als engaged in religious practices.47 There are, however, some
limitations on the exercise by Parliament of its sovereignty, espe-
cially in matters of religion. The entrenchment of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,4" which creates standards
against which legislation and administrative actions must be mea-
sured by the courts, limits the exclusive sovereignty of the legisla-
ture when the courts strike down legislation failing to meet these
standards.49 It should also be mentioned that the Constitution
Act of 1867, which is the major source for the principal division
of sovereignty, is silent in relation to jurisdiction over religion,
religious institutions, and religious practice in Canada, and in
relation to the protection of freedom of religion.5 ° However,
this lacuna can be explained: the protection of the liberties in
matters of religion was left to the common law, inherited as part
of the United Kingdom's constitutional system. Moreover, there
was pre-confederation legislation, which guaranteed the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference."'
45. Although those Christian conceptions may have enjoyed tacit
acceptance in practice. See id.
46. About this power, see A.V. DicEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 39
(10th ed. 1959).
47. For an analysis of Canadian constitutional law, see PETER W. HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF CANADA (3d ed. 1993) and THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (G. A. Beaudoin & E. Ratushny eds., 2d ed. 1989).
48. See Constitution Act, 1982, also known as Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, ch. 11.
,,49. However, it must be mentioned that this restriction is not absolute.
See OGILVIE, supra note 44, at 79, pointing to Section 33 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the "override section") and Part V of the
Constitution Act of 1982 (which ensures the supremacy of the legislature over
the Charter).
50. See Constitution Act, 1867 (U.X.), 30-31 Vict., ch. 3, reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, App. II, No. 5.
51. See, e.g., Freedom of Worship Act, 1851 (U.K.), 14 & 15 Vict., ch. 175.
This Act was enacted to apply to what is present-day Ontario and Quebec. This
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The Constitution Act of 1982 focuses on the protection for
religious freedoms. The preamble to the act states: "Canada is
founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God
and the rule of law."5 2 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms further states that everyone has certain fundamental free-
doms, such as the freedom of conscience and religion,5" and the
right not to be discriminated against based on religion. 4
As to the legal status of religious institutions, the Canadian
system should, by conceptual analysis, be classified somewhere
between the British model of establishment and the American
model of a complete formal equality of all religions (resulting
from the constitutional requirement of separation). The legal
status of religious institutions in Canada encompasses elements
of establishment and of equality.5 Prior to the Conquest of Que-
bec in 1759, the Roman Catholic Church was the only church
permitted in the French colony and enjoyed the status of an
established church. After the enactment of the Constitutional
Act, 1791, the Church of England enjoyed certain property
rights, although the law had never formally recognized it as an
established church. Thus, one may claim that the Church of
England is still the established church of some regions of Can-
ada, since the legislation which established it with certain statu-
tory privileges remains in force in the absence of legislation
disestablishing it. 6 Moreover, the provision in the preamble to
the Constitution Act, 1982, relating to the "supremacy of God"
might be said to accord some constitutional privilege to those
religious institutions that acknowledge this "God."5 7
While the legal status of religious institutions in Canada
partly reflects the British establishment influence, their status is
also subject to the principle of equality of all religions other than
the established church.5 8 The Ontario High Court held that
legislation continues in force in Ontario. See Religious Freedom Act, R.S.O., ch.
R.22 (1990) (0.).
52. Constitution Act, 1982, preamble, also known as Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, ch. 11.
53. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 2(a), Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982.
54. See id. § 15.
55. See M.H. Ogilvie, What is a Church By Law Established?, 28 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 179 (1990).
56. See Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30-31 Vict., ch. 3, § 129, reprinted in
R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. This is the situation in Nova Scotia, see 32 Geo. II,
ch. 5 (1758) (N.S.), New Brunswick, see 26 Geo. III, ch. 4 (1786) (N.B.), and
Prince Edward Island, see 43 Geo. III, ch. 6 (1802) (P.E.I.).
57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
58. See OGILVIE, supra note 44, at 154.
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there is no established church in Ontario as there is in England,
and that all religious bodies are equal before the law.59 However,
the Ontario courts expressed in several cases the view that while
all religious institutions enjoy equality before the law, Christianity
deserves a special protection since it is a part of the common
law.6 ° But, it seems that these rulings would be rejected in mod-
em circumstances." It was held that all religious organizations
are equal in the eyes of the law, including the Church of Eng-
land, which has the same status as that of any other religious
body.62 Moreover, it was held that the common law regarded all
religious organizations as voluntary associations, whose authority
over their members is based on their voluntary membership.
The tribunals of religious organizations are not civil courts and
have no authority derived from the Crown; rather, in order to
give effect to their decisions, church tribunals must apply to the
courts.
63
III. STATE AND RELIGION IN ISRAEL: CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS
When Benjamin Ze'ev Herzel, founder of the Zionist idea,
dreamt about the state of the Jewish nation, he had the vision of
separation of state and religion.6 4 This vision has not become
the reality in Israel.
Separation of state and religion does not exist in Israel.
Israel is defined in its legislation as a 'Jewish and democratic
state."6 5 The Declaration of Independence, which, though lack-
59. Dunnet v. Forneri [1877] 25 Gr. 199 (Ont. H.C.); see also Regina v.
Dickout [1893] 24 O.R. 250 (Ont. C.A.), in which the Ontario Court of Appeal
stated that the fundamental law of the province makes no distinction between
churches and denominations and that everyone is at liberty to worship God as
they please.
60. See Pringle v. Napanee [1878] 43 U.C.Q.B. 285 (Ont. H.C.); Kinsey v.
Kinsey [1894] 26 O.R. 99 (H.C.).
61. See OGILVIE, supra note 44, at 155 (referring to the decision of the
House of Lords in Bowman v. Secular Society, Ltd. [1917] A.C. 406 (H.L.)).
62. See, e.g., Long v. Bishop of Cape Town [1863] 1 Moo P.C.N.S. 411; 15
E.R. 756 (P.C.).
63. See id. These principles were accepted in Canada in subsequent late
nineteenth-century cases, such as Lyster v. Kirkpatrick [1866] 26 U.C.Q.B. 217
(Ont. H.C.).
64. See Amnon Rubinstein, State and Religion in Israel 2 No. 4J. CONTEMP.
HIST. 107, 108 (1969).
65. See, e.g., Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, § 1(a), 1391 L.S.I.
150 (1992) (stating its purpose as "to protect human dignity and freedom in
order to affix in a basic law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and
democratic state.") (Hebrew); Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, § 2, 1454
L.S.I. 90 (1994) (setting out its purpose as defending the freedom of
occupation in order to affix in a basic law the values of the State of Israel as a
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ing formal constitutional validity, serves the courts as a general
guideline in the process of statutory construction and declares
the establishment of a Jewish State based on freedom, justice,
and peace, envisaged by the prophets of Israel.66
One may argue that the term 'Jewish" does not necessarily
refer to a religious identity, but rather a national identity.
According to this line of argument, the usage of this term is
intended to describe a common cultural and historic affiliation
that does not have a direct connection to the Jewish religion.67
Religious interference in matters of state and the state's
establishment of religion can be found in various fields. State
establishment of religion is expressed, for example, in the field
of education (there is an established state religious education sys-
tem68), and in the fact that the Rabbinate and the religious
courts are authorities established by the state's laws. Moreover,
the official status of the Rabbinate in the framework of the state
carries with it the inevitable question of how to determine the
limits of the Rabbinate's freedom of activity. The secular
approach tends to view the Rabbinate as an ordinary government
agency charged with judicial functions specially laid down for it
by state law. Therefore, the Rabbinate is accordingly subject to
judicial review by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its func-
tions, and the exercise of any action not provided by law consti-
tutes an excess of power to be enjoined.69 This status of the
Jewish and democratic state). It should be noted that although Israel has no
formal constitution, the eleven Basic Laws enacted by Israel's parliament
together comprise the evolving Israeli constitution. These laws are relatively.
recent, but the principle of a Jewish State existed from the day of the
establishment of the State, in the Declaration of Independence, and later in
various judgments. See, e.g., Elections Appeal 1/65, Yardor v. The Chairman of
the Election Committee, 19(3) P.D. 365.
66. 1 L.S.I. 3-5 (1948).
67. See Gavison, supra note 34, at 57. For a discussion about the term
"Jewish," see Asher Maoz, The Rabbinate and the Courts: Between the Hammer of Law
and the Anvil of "Halakah," 16-17 HEBREW LAW YEARBOOK 289, 308 (1991)
(Hebrew); Symposium, The Role of Religion in Public Debate in a Liberal Society, 30
SAN DIEGO L. Ruv. 643 (1993). There is a common claim that the Jewish values,
the heritage of Israel (to which The Foundations of Law refers), are broad
enough to include all matters that seem related to our culture and heritage. In
this context, see Aharon Barak, 1 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 528-29 (1992)
(Hebrew); Haim Cohen The Law of Remnant, 13 JEWISH LAW YEARBOOK 285, 300
(1987).
68. State Education Law, 131 L.S.I. 137 (1953). See Stephan Goldstein,
The Teaching of Religion in Government Funded Schools in Israel 20 (1) ISR. L. REV.
36-64 (1992).
69. On the other hand, the Rabbinate's approach is that it is an
autonomous body, free to exercise all the functions ordered or permissible
under Jewish religious law. For example, the Rabbinate Court has passed
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Rabbinate, especially when seen as a government agency that can
be judicially reviewed, illustrates the strong association of state
and the religious bodies in Israel.
The population's religious needs are supplied for by author-
ities established by law (through the religious councils) ,70 budg-
ets are allocated for religious purposes, and there is a Minister of
the Cabinet responsible for religious affairs. Religion's involve-
ment in the state's matters is further expressed, for example, by
the fact that Kosher food is provided for by law in the Israeli
Defense Force, the Israeli army, and in the government facilities,
and special orders in matters of religion were set in the Israeli
Defense Force.71 Many laws are of a religious nature, such as the
laws limiting the raising of swine, or the laws forbidding the pub-
lic showing of leaven ("hamez") during Passover.72
This situation causes a continuous debate. There are schol-
ars who claim that the lack of separation between the state and
religion results in the absence of "freedom from religion," which
is, as described above, a fundamental value in a democratic state
and in a system of fundamental civil rights. Thus, every citizen in
Israel is subject to the authority of religious institutions in mat-
ters of marriage and divorce even against his will. 73 There is no
civil alternative for religious marriage. The situation creates diffi-
culties, especially when religion forbids the marriage of a couple
(such as in the case of a divorced woman and a "Cohen"), but
also in the case of a secular couple that refuses to marry in a
judgements denouncing or ostracizing people who refuse to be judged by the
Rabbinate Court, considering themselves to be outside the Court's jurisdiction.
See H.C. 3269/95, Kats v. The Rabbinate Regional Court in Jerusalem, 50 (4)
P.D. 590 (Hebrew); see also Izhak Englard, Law and Religion in Israel 35 AM. J.
COMP. L. 185, 197 (1987).
70. The religious councils act under the Jewish Religious Services Law,
628 L.S.I. 130 (1949). See H/C 62/69, Asraf v. Eilat's Religious Council, 23(1)
P.D. 655 (Hebrew); see also SHIMON SHETREET, FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND
RELIGION 106 n.25 (1975) (Hebrew).
71. These include, for example, orders that forbid entertainment
activities that involve desecration of the Sabbath. Additionally, the soldier's
burial is a religious ceremony.
72. See Swine Growing Prohibition Law, 377 L.S.I. 106 (1962) and the
amendment to this law from 1988, 5115 R.S.I. 924; Matzoth Holiday Law
[Hametz Prohibition], 119 L.S.I. 220 (1986). On this subject of religious
legislation, see Avner Shaki, Religious Legislation-For and Against, 7 TcHUMIN
521-25 (1986) (Hebrew).
73. The Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law [Marriage and Divorce], 134
L.S.I. 165 (1953), applies to allJewish citizens and residents by the "Halachah of
Israel religious law criteria," even despite their will. About religious marriage,
see Pinhas Shifman, State Recognition of Religious Marriage: Symbols and Content, 21
ISR. L. REv. 501 (1986).
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religious ceremony."4 The legislature's choice of an exclusive
form of religious marriage violates freedom of marriage, and also
freedom from religion, because it obliges the couple to get the
services of a religious agency in its most intimate hour.75
Another example of the deprivation of one's freedom from
religion, which results from the lack of separation between state
and religion, can be found in the subject of the "Sabbath," the
day of rest, and especially concerning the issue of opening busi-
nesses on the Sabbath. Until 1990, the law authorized municipal-
ities to regulate the opening and closing of shops, workshops,
cinemas and other places of public entertainment, and to decide
the opening and closing hours on holidays.76 Under this law,
many municipal bylaws were enacted, which forbade the opening
of businesses on the Sabbath.7 7 This bylaw was reviewed in the
court and was declared void, because it limited the freedom of
religion (which also includes the freedom not to believe) .78 This
limitation can only be effected by the authorization of the legisla-
ture (the Knesset). In response to this decision, the Govern-
ment, which was supported by a coalition composed in part by
religious parties, advanced an amendment to the Municipalities
Ordinances that reversed the court's decision, and allowed the
municipalities to forbid businesses from opening on the Sab-
bath. 79 This development in the law has shown that the lack of
separation between law and religion enables the legislature,
influenced by political considerations, to command the support
of the religious parties in the Knesset and to diminish the civil
rights and freedom of religion.
This latter example reflects the complicated situation in
matters concerning political considerations. Generally, the dif-
ferent branches of government act in opposite directions: while
74. In the matter of marriage and the democratic right for civil marriage
and divorce, see Jessaiah Berlin, Judaism and Israel as a Democracy, in SECULAR
Hum.iNsTiGJUDAISM 2, 4-7 (1988) (Hebrew).
75. See PINHAS SHIFMAN, WHO is AFRAID OF CIVIL MARRIAGE? (1995)
(Hebrew); Shimon Shetreet, Freedom of Conscience and Religion: The Freedom from
Coercion of Religious Norms, the Compulsory Recourse to a Religious Authority and
Imposition of Religious Restrictions, 3 MISHPATIM 467 (Hebrew).
76. The Municipalities Order, § 249(20), 8 L.S.I. 197 (1990).
77. See, e.g., The Bylaw of Jerusalem (Businesses opening and closing),
1955.
78. See Cr. P. (Jerusalem) 3471, 3472/87, State of Israel v. Kaplan,
1988(2) P.M. 265.
79. The Municipalities Order Amendment Law (No. 40), 1336 L.S.I. 34
(1990). However, the municipalities usually do not force the law in this field,
and by this, allow the opening of cinemas and restaurants on Saturday. See
SHIMON SHETREET, BETWEEN THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT-THE
BALANCE OF RIGHTS IN MATTERS OF RELIGION IN ISRAEL 25-26 (1998) (Hebrew).
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the judiciary has contributed to the protection of civil rights in
matters concerning religion and the freedom of and from reli-
gion, the executive and the legislative branches have decreased
this protection, usually at the behest of political interest
groups."0 The Knesset has enacted many laws that have adversely
affected the freedoms and rights in matters of religion, by its own
initiative or as a response to the decisions of the courts. Under
most of the governments, the executive branch had a negative
impact on the balance of the civil rights in matters of religion.
The executive branch's policy throughout these governments
amounted to a constant pattern of refusal to obey the court's
judgments that improved civil rights and freedoms in matters of
religion, or to strengthen the recognition of the supremacy of
the judiciary. However, sometimes, the policy of the executive
branch strengthened these rights when the executive refused to
enforce the laws that imposed a religious regime (such as in the
case of the Sabbath that was mentioned above). The problem is
that this non-enforcement policy has been changed lately, result-
ing in a direct restriction of the rights in matters concerning
religion.
The only ray of light in this situation is the judiciary. The
courts have listened to the public's outcry for freedom from reli-
gious coercion and have rendered judgments improving secular
life and civil rights. Thus, for example, the courts have decided
that public television could broadcast on Saturdays, that cinemas
could remain open to the public on Saturdays, and that Israel
would recognize a non-orthodox conversion that was performed
abroad. These judgments that have strengthened civil rights in
matters of religion, have often caused the executive and legisla-
tive branches to reverse them. Usually this would occur through
executive-initiated legislation, which would effectively reverse the
progress achieved by the judiciary. Despite these laws, however,
the social climate and the public pressure prevented a complete
retreat from the courts' decisions.8 " On rare occasions, the legis-
lation actually continued the improvement tendency achieved by
the courts, such as in reputed spouse cases.8 2
The situation is even more problematic, since there are non-
orthodox Jewish communities which feel discriminated against
and feel that their freedom of religion and belief has been
severely restricted. It is clear that Orthodox Judaism is the for-
80. For comprehensive research on this subject, see generally SHETREET,
supra note 79.
81. For example, in the case of businesses opening on the Sabbath, see id.
82. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, 1391 L.S.I. 150, 150
(1992); Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1454 L.S.I. 90, 114 (1994).
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mally preferred religion and school of Judaism. The state has
constantly refused to grant the Conservative and Reform
Rabbinates the formal status that the Orthodox Rabbinate holds.
Conservative and Reform rabbis do not sit on the religious
courts, are not allowed to carry out marriage ceremonies, do not
serve in the military rabbinate, and do not receive salaries from
the state. Until this author began serving as the Minister of Reli-
gious Affairs, the ministry refused to provide any financial sup-
port to these communities at all, even though the court had so
ordered. These communities feel that this sort of discrimination
severely violates their freedom of religion, especially since they
are forced to use the orthodox services (such as in the fields of
marriage and divorce), even though it is against their belief and
conscience.
This discrimination against the non-Orthodox Jews is also
reflected in the denial of membership to non-Orthodox Jews in
religious councils, which are responsible for providing religious
services. Until recently, non-Orthodox Jews could not participate
as members of the religious councils, as a matter of policy of the
dominant orthodox group. This practice was recently overruled
by the Supreme Court, which allowed non-Orthodox Jews to be
members of the religious councils."3 In one case, the Supreme
Court ordered the Netanya Religious Council to admit Mrs.
Brener, a non-Orthodox female who was excluded from a city's
religious council, in place of another member.8 4 Although the
council allegedly obeyed this decision, it in fact found a way to
avoid its proper implementation. A limited administrative panel
of the council was founded, and the larger panel, in which Mrs.
Brener was admitted to membership, stopped gathering. This
issue of membership in the religious councils has entered public
debate these days because the religious parties have threatened
to withdraw their support of the coalition and the government if
the judgments of the Supreme Court on this topic are enforced.
These numerous examples of violation of rights, equality,
and the freedom of religion and conscience have brought many
people to reconsider the idea of separation between state and
religion. It should be mentioned that those who claim that we in
Israel should separate state and religion often base their argu-
ment on the premise that one's religion is a private matter, and
83. See H.C. 3551/97, Brener v. Ministers Committee According to the
Religious Services Law (not yet published); see also H.C. 4560/94, Hofman v.
Ehud Olmert and the City Council of Jerusalem (not yet published).
84. See H.C. 3551/97, Brener v. Ministers Committee According to the
Religious Services Law (not yet published).
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therefore the state should not interfere in such matters of con-
science and religion.85
A number of proposals for the separation of state and reli-
gion in Israel have been put forward. The Knesset has continu-
ously rejected these attempts. A recent example of an
unsuccessful attempt was the rejection of a bill calling for the
separation of state and religion by May 6, 1999. The bill, among
other things, would have provided for civil marriage and divorce
in Israel. The legislation, proposed by Meretz Knesset member
Naomi Hazan, was defeated 46-22. Justice Minister Tzachi
Hanegbi, who responded for the Government, countered that
the bill, rather than fostering pluralism, would only cause further
division and dissent between secular and religious Israelis.86
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu voted against the bill. The
Labor faction decided in principle to oppose the bill, but gave its
members independent discretion on voting. This rejection
shows that the Israeli public, as represented by its elected Knesset
members, objects to the conceptual model of separation between
state and religion.87
However, a number of developments may lead to more solu-
tions for pressing problems in matters of religion, including mar-
riage, burial, and the like. It is doubtful whether the direction
will be towards separation.88 The pressure for change will be
exercised on a number of fronts. First, the traditional religious
society in Israel is becoming more open to liberal values.
Another development is the increased support for pluralism in
Israeli society. Non-Jewish groups and non-Orthodox Jewish
groups have become more insistent on their civil rights, and the
current situation in matters concerning state and religion has
become unacceptable. The religious institutions themselves have
begun to understand that this politicization has damaged the
religious sector and that only independent religious institutions
can function properly. Another current development is the
growing openness of Israeli society towards civil rights and
human rights.
Another proposal is that the state would give formal recogni-
tion to the religious communities that are not recognized today
85. See Gavison, supra note 34, at 56.
86. For an opposing view, see Alon Harel, Liberalism Versus Jewish
Nationalism: A Case for the Separation of Zionism and State (Hebrew)
(unpublished).
87. Some believe that the separation model is still possible in Israel. I
doubt it.
88. See Ze'ev Falk, Separation of State and Religion and Other Solutions, in
LANDAU BOOK 863, 864 (1995) (Hebrew).
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(for example, non-Orthodox Judaism). This would enable the
state to support equally all existing religions and to correct the
discrimination that occurs today.
Others propose a different approach to keep the current
relationship between state and religion, but to complement it.
According to this proposal, specific arrangements intended to
solve the current difficulties will be implemented to remedy cer-
tain aspects of the present legislation. For example, in matters of
marriage, the religious marriage would still remain the only form
of marriage possible in Israel, except in cases where the person is
disqualified from marriage according to religious law, in which
case there would be a civil alternative.
My view on state and religion in Israeli perspective is that we
should review the definition of the State of Israel as a Jewish and
Democratic State and that this definition should be clarified.
Israel is neither a completely religious state nor a completely sec-
ular one. Israeli society is a Jewish-traditional society, and there-
fore, this should be the constitutional assumption that would
guide the courts when deciding matters of religion.
IV. STATE FUNDING OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
After having analyzed the relation of state and religion as
reflected in Israeli law and practice, we can turn to the question
of state financial support allocated to religious institutions. As
stated above, the model that society had chosen on the issue of
state and religion provides the answer to the question of state
support for religious institutions. When the state adopts a sepa-
ration model, it is clear that the religious institutions will not
receive any direct financial support. Therefore, it was important
for me to state clearly that Israeli practice does not follow a sepa-
ration model. It is also important to mention that there are pro-
posals to change Israeli practice in this regard. Such a change
would certainly alter the state's position on the funding of reli-
gious institutions, although it seems remote that such a change
would be adopted.
As mentioned above, there is no separation of state and reli-
gion in Israel. Therefore, the state broadly supports and
finances religious institutions, especially Orthodox-Jewish ones,
which are backed by the significant political power of the ultra-
orthodox parties in the Knesset.
Government funding for religious institutions has different
sources within the government. Various ministries provide this
funding, including the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry
of Education, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of
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Labor and Welfare, and other ministries that allocate budgets for
specific purposes, many of which are ostensibly non-religious, but
which indirectly contribute to the development of those religious
institutions. The main supporter, however, is still the Ministry of
Religious Affairs, whose budget is mostly designated to the ultra-
orthodox ("Haredi") educational and social services, religious
educational institutions (the "Yeshivas"), religious youth move-
ments, religious cultural institutions (which are institutions that
hold Torah lessons for the ultra-orthodox public), and the reli-
gious research institutions.89 A much smaller part of the Minis-
try's budget is designated for services to the whole public, such as
synagogues, the Chief Rabbinate, the religious courts, and ceme-
tery development. It should be mentioned that the religious
education system is also supported by the Ministry of Education.
In the past, the government's budget included a list of the
sums allocated to religious institutions by name. This grant sys-
tem caused great controversy, and consequently was changed by
an amendment to the Budget Foundations Law. This amend-
ment provided that the Budget Law would appropriate an inclu-
sive sum of support for every category of public institutions,
which would be equally distributed to all institutions included in
that same category.9" Although the amendment apparently
aimed at achieving a fair and equal allocation, equal distribution
was not achieved. The government could continue discriminat-
ing between different public institutions, and could grant greater
allowances to the Yeshivas. This discrimination was possible due
to the formulation of the law. The equal allowance duty applied
only to institutions in the same category, and the government was
not obligated to provide equal funding to different categories.
Another way in which the law deviated from the principle of
equality was through its exception of two institutions-"The
Independent Education System of the 'shkenazi"' and "The
Sephardi Center of Fountain of Religious Education in Israel"-
which are religious "Haredi" education networks, and allowed
the government to provide more support for them. They have
become much larger educational systems as a result of the big
budgets they get from state sources. They offer education, for
lower or no fees, though they do not have a high quality of
education.
89. For the numerical review, see SHIMON SHETREET, THE GOOD LAND:
BETWEEN POWER AND RELIGION 230 (1998) (Hebrew).
90. See Budget Foundations Law, §§ 3(a)(9)-(10), 1139 L.S.I. 60 (1985).
Note that the equality duty is explicit in the words of the law.
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The system of distribution of public funds was challenged in
the Court. An association named "Ma'ale" appealed to the
Supreme Court after its request for allocations had been
denied.9 This association was a nonprofit organization whose
activity focused on "organizing and maintaining religious services
by combining the Torah of the Israeli people, the Israeli nation,
the land of Israel and the State of Israel."92 It requested funding
by virtue of the budget section that was concerned with cultural
activities for the "Haredies." The Supreme Court dismissed the
petition. Justice Barak (now the President of the Supreme
Court) reviewed the legal arrangement and decided that it was
valid. The law, according to his reasoning, properly expressed
the principle of equality in distribution of allowances and in the
authority's duty to act equitably according to reasonable guide-
lines and clear, relevant criteria. I respectfully disagree with this
approach. In his opinion, Justice Barak failed to examine the
actual discrimination in the distributions of allowances and the
priority that was clearly given the "Haredi" institutions.93 He also
dismissed the arguments of the "Ma'ale" association, by deter-
mining that the association was not a "Haredi" one,9 4 and there-
fore was not allowed to receive the allocations.
The question was raised again in 1995, when the State Audi-
tor Report was published.95 The report showed that the Amend-
ment to the Budget Foundations Law had not solved the serious
disorders in the field of financial support given to religious insti-
tutions. The Ministry of Religious Affairs could still support "pre-
ferred" institutions, motivated by political considerations, in the
disguise of neutral legal criteria. The Report described and criti-
cized serious violations and disorders in the allocation system.
For example, the Ministry funded various organizations although
clearly knowing that these organizations' reports were false. In
many cases, the Ministry disregarded the fact that the organiza-
tions had not fulfilled the required terms. Another violation was
the fact that the Ministry ignored the findings of its own internal
audit unit. Even when the Ministry found that there had been
91. See H/C 4346/92, "Ma'ale," the Center of Religious Zionism v. The
Education and Culture Minister, 46 (5) P.D. 590.
92. See id. at 592.
93. See Y. Aviram, Religion and State in Israel-A Legal Review in STATE AND
RELIGION YEARBOOK 124, 130 (1993) (Hebrew).
94. Justice Aharon Barak defined "Haredis" as Jews who keep the
commandments, and whose unity is the fact that they are religiously stricter in
the matters of education, community character, and lifestyle than other
religious Jews. See id.
95. See STATE AUDITOR, ANNUAL REPORT No. 45, at 236 (1995).
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almost no activity in the institutions that requested support, the
Ministry supported them. The report found that the Ministry
had failed in its duty as a public trustee and as responsible party
for the fair and equal distribution of public funds.96
At that time, this author was appointed Minister of Religious
Affairs. I decided to set up a public committee, headed by Pro-
fessor Avraham Friedman, to review the appropriate criteria for
financial support of the Ministry. Another decision was to cut off
immediately the support until the Committee had published its
Report. The Committee's Report was published in August
1995.97 The report focused on the procedures and standards of
the allowances committee. It was decided that the allowances
committee must publish its recommendations that public repre-
sentatives would be members of the allowances committee, and
that an appeal committee would be set up to provide for an
appropriate appellate procedure. The supervision and review
over the decision making and distribution procedures was rein-
forced. In September 1995, I submitted a Notice to the Cabinet,
in which I adopted the Committee's conclusions and hence these
conclusions have become binding. I explained that an extensive
revision was taking place in the Ministry of Religious Affairs and
that my policy, concerning the priorities in the process of the
support allocation, was based on the considerations that had
been acknowledged by the law or by Government decisions, in
order to act with an equal and uniform policy. When the Com-
mittee's Final Report was published in May, 1996, I ordered that
it should be implemented. Unfortunately, the government
changed after the 1996 elections and the new Ministry did not
implement the committee's recommendations.9"
The conclusion to be drawn from this broad review is that
even when the state's policy is to support religious organization,
and to maintain the connection between state and religion, it is
highly important to ensure that principles of justice, equality,
reasonableness, fairness, and appropriate procedure operate in
the allowance distribution process.
As to the question of the appropriate policy on the subject
of government funding of religious institutions, this author has
expressed the view that the answer is derived from the policy
adopted concerning the relationship between state and religion.
The lack of separation in Israel together with the growing power
96. See id. at 261.
97. See Amendment no. 10 of the criteria of the Ministry of Religious
Affairs Allocating of Funds to Public Institutions, Y.P. 1995, 500.
98. See SHETREET, supra note 89, at ch. 15.
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of religious parties in the Israeli parliament, has resulted in con-
tinuous government funding of religious institutions, sometimes
even at the expense of the general public's religious needs. This
preference for the "Haredi" sector will continue as long as it
keeps its political power.
If the author's proposal for a new conception of the term
"Jewish State" is accepted, and we interpret the term to mean a
traditional-Jewish state, we will be able to continue supporting
religious institutions and to allocate that support to the ultra-
orthodox institutions, but also to traditional Jewish institutions,
such as institutes for traditional and secular communities, in
which lessons in Judaism will be taught. Another change that
should occur is a reallocation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs'
budget, so that part of the budget allocated to the general pub-
lic's needs will grow, in order to provide better public religious
services.
V. REFLECTIONS ON ISRAEL AS A JEWISH AND DEMOCRATIC STATE
The flow of substantial state funds to religious institutions
has caused a major change in the power structure of the State of
Israel. The funding of ultra-religious school systems and the dis-
tribution of large amounts of state funds to religious institutions
gave the religious parties and their institutions a great advantage.
Likewise, the large funds granted to Yeshivas for an increasing
number of Yeshiva students has brought about a social crisis and
a structural deficiency in Israeli society, which required immedi-
ate remedy.
The present and future character of the State of Israel is
now at one of the most significant crossroads in the history of the
country. The issue is the direction in which Israel will develop,
given the substantial increase of the religious parties due to the
large amounts of state funds transferred to their institutions.
Will it be a Halacha state? A religious state?
I wish to express some reflections on Israel as a Jewish and
democratic state. I also wish to refer to a strategy to ensure that
Israel remains democratic and yet respectful of its Jewish tradi-
tion. This can be done by adopting an ideology that would view
Israel as Zionist, democratic, and traditional, and by initiating an
Alternative Strategy including an alternative educational system
which would offer three options in one school: general, tradi-
tional, and religious.99
99. Two of the most disputed issues in Israeli society have been brought
to the Supreme Court, the first is the issue of recruiting Yeshiva students to the
armed forces in H.C. 3267/97, Rubinshtein v. Minister of Defence (not yet
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The Conversion Bill, providing that conversion to Judaism
in Israel can be done only in orthodox ceremony, has instigated
a major crisis in the relationship between Israel, the Jewish com-
munity in Israel, and the Diaspora. This crisis must give rise to
an in-depth analysis of the challenges that are posed by the devel-
opments which have resulted in the Conversion Bill. Before sug-
gesting an Alternative Strategy, which should provide a
constructive response to the increasing power of non-democratic
fundamentalists and nationalistic groups in Israel, I wish to out-
line the options that are being proposed by various groups for
dealing with the Conversion Bill. The options are as follows:
first, procedural compromise-freezing the legislation, and with-
drawing the court petitions; second, passing of the present Con-
version Bill; third, initials on ID cards (e.g., Y, M, N); fourth,
amending the present bill to limit the requirements of
Rabbinical approval only for marital status (marriage and
divorce); fifth, expanding the Conversion Bill to invalidate non-
orthodox conversions, whether conducted in Israel or abroad;
sixth, a compromise agreement that will give some role to non-
Orthodox Jewish communities in Israel, along the lines sug-
gested by the Ne'eman Committee (non-orthodox participation
in the education program, and the shared ceremony will be the
orthodox procedure). °
All of these preceding options would not be necessary if
common sense and good judgment had prevailed, and the sense
of strength and power of the religious parliamentary factions had
not given rise to this legislation.
This is another indication of the great need to develop a
new strategy, an Alternative Strategy, for assuring that Israel con-
tinues to be a Zionist, democratic, but yet traditional country; not
a Halacha country, not a strictly religious state, but yet not totally
secular.
I wish to present an Alternative Strategy that could provide
an action plan for making Israel a Zionist, democratic, and tradi-
tional state which will maintain a moderate approach, respect
democracy, and maintain the unity of the Jewish people, but
which will maintain tradition and attachment to Jewish culture.
published); the second is the issue of Jewish Conversion in H.C. 1031/93,
Pesaro v. Minister of Interior, 49 (4) P.D. 661.
100. For an account of the Ne'eman Committee for the Giur issue of
1997, see SHETREET, supra note 89, at 326.
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A. The Diagnosis and Possible Remedy
The aim of the Alternative Strategy is to provide an action
plan in order to develop a constructive response to the challenge
of recent trends in Israeli society of nationalistic radicalization
and religious extremism.
These trends caused the democratic bloc to lose ground to
religious nationalists and ultra-orthodox non-Zionist groups.
These groups defy democratic values, claim exclusivity, and reject
moderation, tolerance, and the pluralism of Jewish people in
Israel and elsewhere. These trends have produced negative
symptoms in Israeli society, including attacks on the Supreme
Court, denial of the principle of the rule of law, delegitimization
of secular Zionism, and the beginning of the legislation of the
Conversion Bill.
The strategy of meeting the challenge of the increasing
power of the radical nationalistic groups and the religious groups
is based on the creation of a partnership between the democratic
secular bloc and the traditional bloc, which is democratic and
mostly Sepharadi, together with the moderate religious.
This strategic partnership will enable the democratic bloc to
maintain the character of the state as Jewish and democratic and
will enable it to prevent developments which are contrary to
democratic values or offensive to certain sectors of the Jewish
people, such as the secular or the non-orthodox.
The Conversion Bill and the previous attempts to change
the definition of who is ajew illustrate that the extreme religious
groups as well as the religious nationalist groups affect the status
of Diaspora Jews, not only that of Jews in Israel. It is therefore as
much the responsibility of Diaspora Jews, as it is that of the dem-
ocratic bloc in Israel, to develop a meaningful response to the
challenge of the increasing power of the non-Zionist and anti-
democratic forces in Israeli society. The Diaspora Jews must take
part in the Israeli agenda in order to prevent an adverse impact
on them by extreme or nationalist religious groups. The rela-
tionship between Israel and the Diaspora should be modeled on
an extended family relationship.
B. The Traditional Bloc
The traditional bloc in Jewish society in Israel has been over-
looked by sociologists and political leaders, as most of them were
unaware that there is an identifiable bloc practicing a certain way
of life that could be defined as "traditional."
The traditional is defined in Israel as middle of the road,
moderate in matters of tradition, respecting tradition, and sup-
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porting democracy. A traditional Jew exercises freedom of
choice in matters of tradition and respects the free choice of
others. The traditional Jew (as well as the secular) defines him-
self as orthodox, but is more moderate in his approach to prac-
ticing the tariag mitzvot (the 613 commandments of Judaism).
The traditional Jew often combines prayer in an orthodox syna-
gogue on Shabbat and driving to a soccer stadium, to a barbecue,
a beach, or a museum.
The division of Israeli Jewish society according to personal
attitude toward religion and tradition is as follows: 4% are ultra-
orthodox (Haredim), 12% are religious (datiim), almost 40% are
traditional (masortiim) and over 40% define themselves as secular( hiloniim) .l01
Traditional Jews supported for many years the first Prime
Minister, David Ben-Gurion and his Mapai Party, but in recent
times, have been reluctant to support the Labor Party because of
its strong association with the radical Left, which caused the
Labor Party to be viewed, by the traditional bloc, as anti-religious.
This is also related to the very strict and hostile attitude of the
ultra-orthodox rabbis toward the Labor Party leaders, in contrast
to their highly forgiving approach to the violations of religious
commandments by leaders of the Right.
Many families from the traditional bloc have been more
inclined to send their children to religious nursery schools
because those schools offer free or low-cost education with trans-
portation, compared to the ordinary high-cost nursery schools of
Naamat or Wizo or other kindergartens. The result is that people
who are democratic and traditional in attitude are attracted by
religious organizations at an early age, and later become associ-
ated with a political movement which is religiously extreme,
although originally they were not ultra-orthodox.
Against this background there is a pressing need to develop
a partnership of the democratic bloc with the traditional bloc on
the ideological and operational levels. Such a partnership could
also include the moderately religious as well as those who are
concerned with excess religious radicalism.
The plan to create a partnership between the democratic
secular bloc and the traditional (democratic) bloc and the mod-
erate religious is based on two levels. One is on the ideological
level; the other is on the operational level. On the ideological
level, there is a need to promote, develop, and market a moder-
ate ideology of the State of Israel as a Zionist, democratic, and
traditional state. On the operational level, there is a need to
101. See id, at 498.
449
450 NOTRE DAMIE JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13
develop an alternative educational system, and to lobby for legis-
lation to implement it. This alternative educational system
should offer three options of education in one school: general
(secular), traditional, and religious.
C. The Ideological Level
As to the first level, the development and dissemination of
an ideology of a Zionist, democratic, and traditional state, a
number of points need to be emphasized. The concept of "Zion-
ist" emphasizes commitment to Zionism and rejects the position
of the ultra-orthodox. At the same time, it rejects religious radi-
cal nationalistic attitudes.
The rejection of the ultra-orthodox position is important.
The real meaning of Zionism has to be reinstated and empha-
sized because the ultra-orthodox do not recognize Zionism of the
state nor do they respect its flag. They do not share the recogni-
tion of Independence Day, nor do they participate in the memo-
rials to the dead Israeli Defense Force soldiers, nor of the
Holocaust victims, hence the importance of the emphasis on
Zionism.
The nationalistic religious groups have, in recent years,
directed themselves less to religious Zionism and more to nation-
alistic religious directions, with the result being greater radical-
ization at the expense of democratic values. This underscores
the importance of emphasis on a Zionism that is democratic.
The emphasis on a democratic state refers to the impor-
tance of the rule of law, human rights, rights of non-Jews,ju'dicial
independence, the High Court of Justice, and equality of all,
including the recognition of pluralism in Jewish life.
The principle of "traditional" denotes that the country is
neither a religious nor a Halacha state, but neither is it totally
secular; rather, it is in the middle of the road, moderate, and
traditional. This concept is generally reflective of the factual situ-
ation since 1948 and the subsequent changes.
This concept reflects the de facto practice of observance of
certain basic Jewish values by the Jewish State, including Shabbat,
kosher, religious marriage, and education. This arrangement was
effected by virtue of the agreements, known as the Status Quo
Statement, between the founder, David Ben-Gurion, and other
Zionist leaders. The Zionist groups formed the consensus and
then committed to the Haredi group-"Agnda." This agreement
was designed to form a unanimous agreement on the Declara-
tion of Independence and to create a united front of the Jewish
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people vis-a-vis the British and the international community in
the efforts to achieve the establishment of the State of Israel.
The concept of traditional country will enable the demo-
cratic bloc to make an honest effort at attracting the support of
the traditional bloc. The adoption of the proposed ideology will
give a clear message that the democratic bloc respects tradition
and Jewish heritage and culture, as well as democratic values and
principals. Such ideology will make it difficult, though not totally
impossible, for the opponents and rivals of the democratic bloc
to depict it as anti-religious and hostile to tradition as is the situa-
tion today.
On the cultural level, the alternate parallel education system
will give an adequate response to the present unsatisfactory state
of affairs in which the ordinary secular Jewish Israeli is totally
detached from his Jewish culture.
D. The Operational Level
The second level of the action plan is operational. It relates
to the creation of an alternative educational system and the lob-
bying for such alternative education in Parliament and in general
public opinion. I propose that the democratic bloc will support a
system of education that will offer both democratic and tradi-
tional Jewish values.
The alternative education school should offer one school
and three options. The options should be the general, the tradi-
tional, and the religious. The idea is that all will study democracy
and tradition, and the Jewish tradition studies will encompass a
different scope in each of the options. The general will study
less, the traditional option will study more, and the religious
option will study the most Jewish tradition as well as conduct
prayers in school. In the alternative education system, teachers
will be excluded from proselytizing. They will teach Jewish cus-
toms, traditions, and thoughts, but must refrain from advocating
hazara bitshuva (changing one's way of life to that of a religious,
observant Jew). Whoever is not able to refrain from proselytizing
should be disqualified from teaching in the alternative system.
The alternative system will be created to parallel and supple-
ment the existing educational systems, which will continue to
operate. The alternative system will only add to the existing
options of schools.
Another aspect of the action plan is legislation providing for
the compulsory study of democracy and tradition in all schools.
Schools that refuse to include democracy or tradition studies will
lose 30% of their state support. The action plan will be paid for
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by funds from non-governmental organizations plus state funds
that are afforded to schools. In addition, a public campaign will
be conducted to promote legislation introducing the alternative
education system.
The work plan of the Alternative Strategy calls for a study
group of education experts and educators to lay down in detail
the "one-school three-option" plan, and to establish pilot projects
in a number of cities. In addition, a lobby strategy has to be laid
down for a legislative program for free and compulsory educa-
tion beginning at age four, for the "one-school three-option"
model, and for compulsory studies of tradition and democracy in
all schools.
This concept is a result of the analysis of Jewish society in
Israel: 40% of the Jewish population define themselves as secular,
20% as religious, and 40% as traditional (ews that fulfill most of
the religion's commandments, but oppose any kind of religious
coercion).102 The majority of Israel's Jewish society opposes a
regime of separation of state and religion and would like to
maintain the state's definition as a Jewish State.103
According to this new approach which I have advocated, the
term "Jewish" in the definition of the state as a "Jewish and Dem-
ocratic State" will be understood as "traditionalism." Therefore,
legislation of a national nature, such as the law that forbids open-
ing of "entertainment businesses" (such as restaurants, cinemas,
and theatres) on the "Ninth of Av" (the date of the destruction of
the Jewish Temple),1°4 is justified.0 5 The interpretation of the
terms in Jewish traditionalism should neither be strict nor broad.
We should find a moderate way, for example, the Kashrut.(the
Jewish dietary laws). We should not abolish the Kosher require-
ment in government institutes and in the army, but the interpre-
tation of this term should not use the orthodox strict approach.
Thus, the Kashrut of a restaurant will be examined by the Kashrut
of the food served, and not by the religiousness of its owners.
This is, in this author's view, the solution for most problems in
matters concerning religion in Israel.
102. See id.
103. See SHETREET, supra note 79, at 43. This majority is composed of
many of the liberal seculars, the traditional society, and the religious Jews that
respect democracy and civil rights.
104. The Prohibition of the Opening of Entertainment Business on the
Ninth of Av Law, 1637 L.S.I. 8 (1997). The Ninth of Av is the day of the
destruction of the Temple according to the Jewish calendar.
105. This is true if we explain this law as a national memorial day for the
destruction of the Kingdom and the Temple (Beit ha-Mikdash). See Shetreet,
supra note 75, at 467.
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CONCLUSION
What lesson, if any, can be learned by American students of
the relationship between religion and the state from the Israeli
experience of state funding of religious institutions? The
voucher system, if operated innocently by individuals, may seem
completely required by an equality and neutrality approach. But
one should also consider the possibility that powerful religious
institutions might alternatively take advantage of the voucher sys-
tem. They can attempt to attract students and families to their
own way of life, and thus, they can create centers of power
through the provision of social services.
This power can be employed for political purposes to
increase the resources given to them, and thus generate a
dynamic process of increased power resulting in turn in
increased resources, and so on. This is what happened in Israel,
and it may possibly occur with differences of circumstances and
scope in other societies such as the United States.
In Israel, the result is that students who go to Haredi-Reli-
gious School (ultra-orthodox schools) will never become high-
tech company executives such as the "Mirabellis" wizards, who
sold their company to America On Line (AOL) for $400 million.
In Israel, it is a struggle between two cultures, civil and pro-
ductive society on the one hand, committed to distinction, com-
petition, and entrepreneurship, and religious non-productive
society on the other.
Human experience suggests that powerful religious organi-
zations caA operate similarly in widely different societies. Those
who .will receive the vouchers to religious schools will not be AOL
executives. Thus, they will lose personal wealth and well-being,
and society at large will lose productive power.' 6 Likewise, the
increased role of religious institutions may affect the values of
civil society if the religious institutions select to employ their
increased political power to further values which are inconsistent
with those of civil society.
106. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 78.

